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THAR BE DRAGONS: PLOTTING A COURSE FROM WAR TERMINATION TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

04 February 2002

CAPT Mike Critz, USN

Abstract

Following the implosion of the Soviet Union, the U.S. has found itself in unexplored territory similar to the days of early sailing ships crossing uncharted oceans. The captains of those ships of yore typically only plotted courses through waters familiar to them. Similarly, commanders today plan for conflict in terms familiar to them: combat of arms with a clearly defined enemy. With the recognition that we frequently deal in operations other than war, a paradigm shift is required to ensure planning the transition between war termination and conflict resolution. This is new and unexplored territory containing many lessons from operations conducted in the last decade. After achieving the military objective, what should be the CINC's responsibilities for deliberate and crisis planning for the transition to the strategic desired end-state? This paper proposes fundamental tenets, extrapolated from case studies of Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, for the consideration of the operational commander during initial war/other than war planning to achieve enduring results. These include determination of a desired end state, training, centralized command and control, and synchronization of forces, in order results to achieve enduring.

“A period of post conflict activities exists from the immediate end of the conflict to the redeployment of the last US Service member.”¹

“Thar be dragons.” In the days of sail, before the seven seas were charted, navigation through unexplored waters was generally avoided. Charts marked warnings with ominous clouds and mysterious beasts to indicate unexplored regions of a dubious nature. The expression implied that to enter meant certain peril. Consequently, ships' captains did not deliberately plan to traverse these waters and sailed only in areas with which they were familiar.

Several hundred years later, commanders appear to avoid planning for the post-hostilities phase of an operation. Yet the development of a clear strategy to navigate from war termination to the desired end-state is essential to ensure enduring conflict resolution. Operational Commanders primarily focus on war termination: how to achieve victory in combat. However, integration of the military with the other instruments of national and international power that ultimately share the burden of responsibility for shaping the post conflict environment, is generally neither emphasized in theater peacetime engagement nor in deliberate or crisis planning. Disparity exists between war termination and conflict resolution planning. The military primarily concentrates on the former, frequently allowing the latter to resolve itself.²

The demise of the Soviet Union removed many coercive restraints that had contained intra-state hostilities. Unchecked, these hostilities have erupted into 40 unresolved armed conflicts threatening post-Cold War regional stability;³ many indistinguishable from total war. Future conflicts will likely involve separating enemies, rather than fighting them, and will be characterized by low intensity, decentralized combat fought along a cultural axis rather than geographic fronts. However, the U.S. military continues to develop combat systems and tactics emphasizing war fighting capabilities.⁴ Battlefield victory is achieved without necessarily altering the fundamental cause of the conflict.

Examination of campaign planning indicates that we indeed concentrate efforts on the short-term defeat of a belligerent with overwhelming and technologically superior force. Planning and synchronizing the *inevitable* transition to conflict resolution is secondary, if considered at all. What are the CINC's responsibilities for deliberate and crisis planning for the transition to the strategic desired end state? This paper proposes fundamental tenets, extrapolated from case studies of Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, for consideration by the operational commander during planning.

These studies demonstrate the effects of the presence or absence of planning for activities between war termination and conflict resolution. This reveals a need to reevaluate the planning process and emphasize transition planning with regard to the desired end state. Although joint doctrine delineates considerations for interagency coordination, this emphasis is subordinate to the planning of overwhelming, decisive force to achieve favorable war termination conditions. Proactive consideration and planning of post hostilities activities, oversight, orchestration of those activities throughout the campaign, and management of qualitative and quantitative variables impacting conflict duration and resolution, will chart a confident course from war termination to conflict resolution.

Somalia Case Study

“The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment...is to establish...the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”

Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*

“Sure we can get in. But how do we get out?”

Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor, 21 November 1992⁵

When CENTCOM briefed RESTORE HOPE to the National Command Authority (NCA) as the subsequent operation for the United Nations Operations in Somalia's (UNOSOM I) failing humanitarian efforts, neither consideration to military action following an opposed entry, nor guidance to clearly define an end state, had been provided to the CINC.

In December 1992, the United Task Force (UNITAF) relieved UNOSOM I incorporating “overwhelming military force” with robust Rules of Engagement (ROE).⁶ It did not develop a transition plan that would systematically transfer responsibility of the mission to UNOSOM II, which relieved UNITAF in May 1993. Command relationships that gave UNITAF unity of effort and de facto unity of command disintegrated under UNOSOM II.⁷ Mediation between the military and warring factions, initiated and led by Robert Oakley⁸, the former Ambassador to Somalia, disappeared. Daily pol-mil dialogue reinforced by the U.S. Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), a conduit between military, non-governmental organizations (NGO), private organizations (PVO), and political representatives that increased mutual cooperation and humanitarian activities,⁹ was not sustained in support of UNOSOM II.

Although Ambassador Oakley terminated his liaison between UNITAF and the warlords, the U.S. failed to evaluate the impact of the absence of his efforts or the vacuum that would be created by the removal of the CMOC. Instead, discourse and negotiation was replaced with indiscriminate force, intended to support the security of UNOSOM II.

In the transition to UNOSOM II, the U.S. military lost influence with leaders of the opposed factions. Stove-piping between varying interagency and military organizations, disunity between the foreign militaries, wide interpretations of rules of engagement, and disrupted pol-mil coordination contributed to a perception of UN weakness by the more aggressive warlords; primarily General Mohammed Aideed.¹⁰ Disarmament, eliminated by UNITAF under CENTCOM leadership as not militarily achievable or conducive to stabilization,¹¹ substituted humanitarian assistance. Somali readiness to assume responsibility for their socio-political destiny, was replaced with challenges against UNOSOM II’s resolve and military strength.¹²

U.S. forces under the operational control of CENTCOM, not the UNOSOM II Commander, signaled unilateral U.S. action to the participating nations, which eroded the unity of effort.¹³ U.S. military activities rapidly escalated to offensive actions. These culminated in the

fatal raid against Aideed's headquarters, executed by U.S. Special Forces outside the UNOSOM II and CENTCOM chains of command,¹⁴ despite recommendations by CENTCOM to terminate the military approach.¹⁵ This triggered the eventual collapse of UNOSOM II.

The U.S. military envisioned an unchallenged turnover by the hostile parties and did not develop a plan to support the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II.¹⁶ Without a synchronization plan, U.S. efforts to support UNOSOM II focused on offensive objectives instead of its original charter of maintaining a stable, credibly enforced environment.

Bosnia Case Study

“Knowing when to terminate military operations and how to preserve achieved advantages is a component of strategic and operational art...JFCs must know how the NCA intend to terminate the operation and ensure its outcomes endure and then determine how to implement that strategic design at the operational level.”

JP 3-0, III-24

Planning for U.S. military involvement in Bosnia began as early as June 1992. However, it was split between several subordinate EUCOM commands, resulting in disjointed efforts.¹⁷ A Joint Task Force (JTF) was not established and liaison officers were assigned ad hoc throughout the subordinate commands.¹⁸ With an absence of command guidance, exacerbated by a lack of strategic planning processes or combined doctrine, EUCOM planners compartmentalized their efforts resulting in uncoordinated campaign planning. This contributed to the evolution of separate operational chains of command within the NATO hierarchy.¹⁹ Meanwhile, the U.S. cautiously increased its military presence in the Balkan Theater. No-fly zones were established, followed by ships deployed in the Adriatic to enforce UN sanctions and an arms embargo beginning in 1992. The next three years were shrouded with political indecisiveness.

Strategic strikes against Bosnian-Serb command and control, ammunition, artillery, and air defense sites, in response to escalating atrocities committed by their military,²⁰ finally precipitated a cease fire. This led to the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) enforced by the Implementation Force (IFOR). Artificially conceived by political leaders to achieve its goals within 12 months, military planners subscribed to an unrealistic timeline. IFOR became the

Stabilization Force (SFOR) with an 18-month charter extended twice and currently reviewed semiannually with no predictable end in sight. The DPA only established a partition and was designed to be militarily enforceable²¹, not necessarily resolve the source of the conflict: hundreds of years of ethnic hatred.²² Provisions for civil-military and information operations in support of civil affairs, delineated in the DPA, were neglected in favor of offensive military applications, placing low priority on post-conflict activities.²³ Military operations were predominantly planned at the expense of support to civilian agencies from the beginning of the IFOR mission.²⁴

Early interagency and NGO/PVO coordination was inconsistent,²⁵ exacerbated by classified OPLANS and difficulties establishing a Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) staff element or CMOC.²⁶ Without a liaison mechanism between the intervening force and the host nation, military actions were perceived as favoring particular groups, destabilizing the entities.²⁷ Many multinational participants, including those upon whom the DPA would be enforced, were excluded from the implementation planning process.²⁸ Without CIMIC interaction, the Multinational Force (MNF) was obligated to remain in order to guarantee implementation of the socio-economic and political aspects of the DPA. This preordained a military condition that could not alter or monitor the cultural differences existing in the original conflict. Sustained by arbitrarily assigned timetables, an unreasonable condition for success was fostered. Without a clearly defined desired end state, the conditions to relinquish responsibility to intermediaries, and finally the host nation, remain undefined. Consequently, the U.S. military is indefinitely committed to monitor a stagnant civil condition, while controversial progression in the democratic process continues to be critically evaluated within the international arena.

Haiti Case Study

“The effort focuses on ensuring that the results achieved endure and the conditions that resulted in the conflict do not recur.”²⁹

Military action in Haiti fell on the heels of the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia. Although the situation percolated throughout the Somali debacle, it represents the best example of State and Defense Department cooperation. The Haiti interagency task group included the military in the planning process from the beginning.³⁰ In 1991, General Roul Cedras overthrew Jean Bertrand Aristead in a military coup. Despite a July 1993 agreement signed by Cedras to allow Aristead to return to Haiti by 30 October, UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) peacekeepers were turned away 11 October.³¹ This created an influx of refugees into the U.S. and a national security crisis.³²

The UN authorized a U.S.-led Multinational Force (MNF) to enter Haiti to establish a “secure and stable environment”.³³ Although an opposed-entry had been planned (RESTORE DEMOCRACY), Cedras capitulated 19 September 1994, allowing a permissive entry into the country (UPHOLD DEMOCRACY) the following day.³⁴ Strong interagency cooperation during early planning allowed the 21,000 troop-strong force to establish appropriate rules of engagement, develop objectives and subordinate tasks, and rapidly fill the vacuum in civilian law enforcement created by the sudden collapse of the junta government. This was facilitated by the creation of a Peace Operations Synchronization Tool (POST), derived from the Army’s Battlefield Operating System, during the earliest planning prior to deployment.³⁵

Unlike Somalia, when the UNMIH relieved the MNF, U.S. Special Forces remained under U.S. OPCON only to protect U.S. personnel; not to execute missions in support of vaguely defined UN objectives.³⁶ Arrival of the UNMIH advance team three weeks after the MNF gave them five months dedicated preparation to determine objectives, define the military limitations to achieve those objectives, and assume responsibility for the mission. Emphasis was placed on creating a framework to hold democratic elections and institute a competent and capable host-nation police force. Initially concerned with the presence of armed civilians, a disarmament

effort conducted by the peacekeepers was evaluated as detrimental to the mission of sustaining the MNF-established secure and stable environment and exceeded the military's capacity.³⁷

By December 1996, elections had been held and a democratic turnover of power between Aristead and Preval took place in February. UNMIH forces had trained over 5000 Haitian police. UNMIH was relieved by the UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) in June 1996 to train additional Haitian police and sustain the secure environment.³⁸ With each transition from the original MNF, there was a corresponding decrease in force strength.

UPHOLD and RESTORE DEMOCRACY had clear objectives; applied appropriate, deliberate force, and worked closely with agencies responsible for creating an environment suitable for a stable democracy. Synchronizing activation of predominately civil-affairs reserve personnel, proved invaluable for the successful transition to the UN mission.³⁹ Unlike Somalia, civil-military functions were planned prior to execution and designed to sustain a UN turnover.

The Three Dragons

In charting the seas between war termination and conflict resolution since the end of the Cold War, these case studies provide clear indications and warnings of three dragons of which to beware. The first dragon dwells deep within the mist and fog of political turmoil and beguiles the commander to relentlessly pursue it into shoal water. Shaping this sea serpent into a clear desired end state is the single most important criteria for enduring campaign success. Defined as a "set of conditions necessary to resolve a crisis and transition from the predominant use of the military instrument of national power to other instruments,"⁴⁰ it is achieved through a combination of equally interactive qualitative (diplomatic and information) and quantitative (military and economic) components.

Military conditions contribute to attaining the desired end state defined by the NCA. However, it is incumbent on the operational commander to advise the NCA whether those conditions can be attained through military force and how that force will be integrated with the

other forms of national power. Furthermore, there may be enormous disparity between how the U.S., coalition, and target nation perceive the end state. A realistic assessment can only be made by consulting the global and regional organizations, interagencies, and the primary NGO/PVOs that ultimately assume responsibility for the mission, as well as correctly evaluating the belligerents. Without including all parties at the onset of planning to define a mutually envisioned end state, or at a minimum, understand each constituent's perception of the end state, the conditions that establish successful conflict resolution cannot be achieved.

The second dragon has multiple heads, each potentially driving the body in a different direction. In the post-Cold War era, multinational command and control (C2) is a leviathan of independent military, state, and organizational chaos without a single focal point directing unified action. Each case study shares a period of direct civil interaction. The degree of success corresponds to the duration of CIMIC at the operational level. Temporarily achieved during UNITAF, and sustained throughout all phases in Haiti, an operational level of coordination and oversight, linking the strategic and tactical constituents, was required to conceive, execute, and sustain a viable strategy. UNITAF initiated a robust civil-military operation (CMO) at the tactical level, strongly influenced by Ambassador Oakely's efforts linking tactical military actions with strategic and diplomatic efforts. When these operations were terminated, UNOSOM II collapsed due to an absence of operational continuity that could sustain the CMO effort. In this vacuum, the U.S. military defaulted to executing combat-oriented missions.

The vacancy of civil-military operational coordination, the military predominantly concentrates on measurable objectives to disrupt and destroy the means by which the belligerents manifest and sustain violence. This ignores the qualitative aspects of negotiation facilitated by CMO. The principle of "overwhelming force" has become the foundation of all planning.⁴¹ General Wesley Clark has commented, "Decisive results are obtained from *offensive* action and *maneuver*."⁴² This highlights the predilection to default to the use of overwhelming combat

power against defined target sets and to subordinate all other objectives. The key, however, is tempering combat power with a corresponding diplomatic effort.

Implementation of the DPA in Bosnia did not include a focused CMO effort. Despite recognizing CMO as vital to the peace process, JOINT ENDEAVOR neglected to include all participants during the DPA negotiations. Complete inclusion may have facilitated unity of effort as well as incorporate a sense of ownership on the part of the belligerents who were ultimately responsible for making the plan work. Consequently, the operation suffered from a perpetual imbalance between military combat power at the tactical level and qualitative socio-political dynamics at the strategic level. An authoritative conduit to link the two was missing.

Only in Haiti was equilibrium achieved between all constituents as a function of deliberate operational planning and execution, attesting to the need for either unified *de facto* or *de jure* C2. Haiti demonstrated that when multinational command and control is integrated with CMO functions, full spectrum dominance and civil military cooperation can be achieved, steadily contributing to mission success. Conflict resolution was dependent on host nation behavior modifications, catalyzed by the international community. UPHOLD DEMOCRACY met objectives predetermined by the participants.

Operational coordination must accomplish two military conditions. First, create a stable environment to allow the belligerents to viably negotiate and adhere to peace settlements, without inadvertently establishing a framework for an operational pause within the hostilities phase. This is achieved by mutual cooperation with, and full integration of, NGO/PVOs and interagencies. Otherwise, military conditions may only produce an operational pause, leading decision makers to conclude that transition out of the hostilities or post-hostilities phase is acceptable, when the fundamental cause of the conflict has not been altered.

Second, a target entity must perceive that the intervening force is willing to impartially apply the threat of force into action. Impartiality is dependent upon enforcement of

predetermined, well promulgated, rules understood by the entities without providing opportunities for them to circumvent those rules. In turn, factional violence is deterred with credible force in an environment that produces desired behavior modifications. Military presence, the visible threat of force, must be proportional to a redeployment timeline relevant to host-nation progression toward the end state and its ability to self-enforce end state policies.

Lastly, the third dragon is the child of the second. Dysfunctional C2, or cooperation, begets disjointed planning and synchronization. Expertise in the specific areas of civil-military relations must be integrated into the initial command infrastructure and planning process to be sustained throughout the campaign. Without calculating political and civil considerations, military action may only exacerbate the cultural dimension of the conflict.

Force synchronization in the Joint Service Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) concentrates on hostilities. Consequently, plans do not adequately incorporate phasing of responsibilities with political, interagency, and NGO/PVOs. JOPES only outlines basic considerations for post-hostilities planning and the military conditions necessary to transition from war termination to peace.⁴³ A change is required to place equal, or greater, emphasis on transition planning in order to maintain the “dominance” achieved during armed conflict and apply that dominance to “**leverage** or **impose** a lasting solution.”⁴⁴

UNITAF was unable to transition its short-term success to UN authority because of its tactical planning horizon. Under UNOSOM II, the U.S. refocused efforts toward capturing Aideed when it previously had been an impartial presence during RESTORE HOPE. This precipitated an artificial timeline when the President directed withdrawal no later than March 1994. Similarly, the early stages of JOINT ENDEAVOR emphasized a tactical planning horizon that emasculated planning and produced unpredictable deployment timelines. RESTORE DEMOCRACY, however, and its almost instantaneous transition to UPHOLD DEMOCRACY,

was successful because it deliberately planned for transition between military, political, and international authorities throughout every phase of the campaign.

Although Joint Doctrine delineates the ingredients of post-hostilities activities,⁴⁵ integration of those considerations is vague and disconnected. Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures states, “A **‘transition plan’ should be developed as an *initial step in the transition process.*”⁴⁶ Doctrine, littered with similar recommendations, fails to emphasize the importance of proactive post-hostility planning and ignores synchronizing actions that potentially influence the post-hostilities environment. This implies that transition planning can be procrastinated without negatively influencing the campaign, excluding the qualitative dimensions of political, civil, and military interaction. Waiting for the transition phase to occur is too late.**

Doctrine also delineates planning as a linear process. The phases occurring within conflict may collapse into pre-hostility or hostility phase conditions, not simply transition to peace as a logical next step. As witnessed in Somalia and Bosnia, transition schemes that fail to consider the dynamics between pre-hostility, hostility, and post-hostility phases, foster mission creep and indefinite timelines. Transition planning is complex due to the number of participants required to integrate and plan a successful, enduring outcome in a multinational, interagency environment. Termination criteria must be fashioned early to ensure the military conditions endure.⁴⁷ They are too critical to be developed *during* the campaign.

Setting Sail and Slaying Dragons

Before sailing off in search of dragons, it is prudent to conduct comprehensive training. These case studies infer that training, which builds on national and multinational cooperation, is inadequate. The debacle of Somalia and the intervention in Haiti contributed to Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, signed in 1997. The directive called for integration of interagency planning and training with military components. “Dedicated mechanisms and integrated planning processes are needed.”⁴⁸ However, a 1999 report to the Joint Chiefs indicated no action has been

taken and that both military institutions and government agencies were reluctant to take a lead in executing the intent of the directive.⁴⁹

In the absence of combined, multinational, or global doctrine, planning and execution has required U.S. lead and organization temporarily achieved through UN mandates. To date, regional organizations, such as NATO, have not developed a deliberate or crisis planning process in response to scenarios involving military action outside of warfare.⁵⁰ Furthermore, post-hostilities activities are rarely exercised through peacetime engagement events.

One solution is to incorporate transition planning between each phase of conflict into Theater Engagement Plans (TEP). This involves the global, regional, and interagency participation in bilateral and multilateral training events. Refocusing training objectives from war fighting elements to peace operations will contribute to the development of a viable, combined transition doctrine. Warfighting skills are perishable and must be practiced; however, post-hostilities activities should not be merely simulated in favor of combat sustainment training.

Although TEPs aggressively integrate unity of effort in crisis situations, engagement fails to train to, evaluate post-hostilities activities, or integrate and transition to other instruments of power. Exercises must include active interagency, NGO/PVO, and political representation. If the UN continues to assume ultimate responsibility for operations, effort should be made to integrate the military arm of the United Nations (Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Military Staff) into TEP. The MILSTAFF is a vital component to the development of a shared doctrine, and unity of effort, in the interim period leading to a common doctrine.

In the turbulent and often unfamiliar waters between war termination and conflict resolution, a dedicated helmsman in the form of centralized civil-military command and control (C2), or at a minimum, cooperation, is mandatory. Current relationships depicted in Figure 1, are inadequate, and many times, dysfunctional.




Figure 1
Current Multinational Operations Model for Coordination Between Military and Non-Military Organizations⁵¹

Centralized cooperation involves consolidation of the global and regional organizations, interagencies, and primary NGO/PVO decision makers into a single authoritative body during initial planning. One method to achieve this is strategic designation of a [Combined] Joint Forces Civil Operations Component Commander (JFCOCC) (Figure 2). This elevates the responsibilities of the CMOC from the tactical level, empowering it with operational oversight. Civil-military operations should no longer be subordinate to the war fighting components that must provide periodic support throughout the conflict and negotiations. Assuming future missions will resemble the historical trend of de facto U.S. leadership, endorsed by a UN mandate, continuity and authority throughout the duration of the campaign is retained within a single command structure. Transition of responsibility or relocation of personnel from the strategic, operational, or tactical level is no longer required, providing a mechanism to link the diplomatic, regional, and interagency participants. This also facilitates unity of effort by creating an environment of equality between the participants.




Figure 2
Proposed Multinational Model⁵²


NGO/PVO and interagencies, who are the subject matter experts, should be considered as the supported elements of the campaign, not constraints to it. It is they who ultimately bear the burden of responsibility once the military option is withdrawn.

Operationalizing civil-military operations to the level of a component commander provides the opportunity to integrate NGO/PVOs at the beginning of the campaign and ensures a seamless transition when the heart of the campaign shifts from operational fire and maneuver functions to post-hostility activities. This is similar to the concept of designating a subordinate Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) if the scope of civil-military operations exceeds the CINC staff's ability to coordinate activities.⁵³ The fundamental difference from current doctrine is that it elevates a special purpose, subordinate role of a coordination cell, to the level of a functional component commander who can eventually assume the responsibility of the *main effort* of the campaign.

Although functional components are optional,⁵⁴ cooperation between the military and the participating political and interagency organizations is not. This concept enables crisis planning of post-hostilities activities within a multinational campaign and achieves balance between the authority of the operational commander and the objective. By maintaining operational connectivity between the participants, coalition actions counterproductive to the target nation's development are reduced or eliminated.

Operational direction, recognizing the interaction of the phases of conflict to the desired end state, allows synchronization of the operation. Synchronization plans are typically only prepared for combat and operational functions, ignoring post-hostilities activities.⁵⁵ The Air

Figure 3
Conflict Resolution Framework⁵⁶
E (Economic), P (Political), M (Military)



Command and Staff College model (Figure 3) depicts transitional dynamics between each phase that occurs between the initial conflict and desired end state. Doctrine should direct the joint force commander to develop a synchronization matrix that corresponds to this spectrum of conflict, beginning with deliberate planning during peace time evaluated through TEP. Synchronization planning must recognize that each phase of a conflict has the potential to

collapse into previous phases, or jump to a future phase, including the desired end state.

Planning and synchronizing forces to support these transitions requires a paradigm shift from emphasizing offensive operations executed in a pre-hostilities or hostilities phase. Missions required during post-hostilities activities include humanitarian assistance, civil support, force protection, disarmament or weapons cantonment, no-flight enforcement, and establishment of safe areas. Full consideration of tasks and their effect on every phase of the campaign, past or present, must be war-gamed prior to beginning operations in order to not inadvertently influence undesirable behavior by the entities.⁵⁷

The synchronization matrix, a sample of which is proposed in Figure 4⁵⁸, should be developed in a multinational environment during deliberate planning. It must be configured to execute objective-oriented tasks that establish military conditions not constrained by arbitrary timelines that determine when those conditions are met. This allows for qualitative dynamics of behavioral modification that may not occur along predictable timelines and accounts for a return to hostilities if settlement dissolves or a new dispute is manifested. The matrix reflects three intra-phase transitions beginning with transformation, developing through stabilization, and finally normalization.⁵⁹ Initially, overwhelming military power on scene immediately following war termination assumes the majority of tasks and provides resources not available to the host nation or interagencies.⁶⁰ As the NGO/PVO and interagencies become established and the

PHASE	TASK	TRANSFORMATION	STABILIZATION	NORMALIZATION
DIPLOMATIC				
	RESTORE GOVERNMENT	USAID	USAID	USAID
	REMOVE ROGUE LEADERS		HAGUE	HN/HAGUE
	PIFWO		HAGUE	HN/HAGUE
	POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE	UN/USAID/ICRC	UN/USAID/ICRC	HN/ICRC
INFORMATION				
	THEATER RECONNAISSANCE	MIL/CIA		CONTRACTOR
	TRACK TARGETS	MIL/CIA		CONTRACTOR
MILITARY				
OP INTELLIGENCE				
	THEATER RECONNAISSANCE	MIL/CIA		CONTRACTOR
	TRACK TARGETS	MIL/CIA		CONTRACTOR
OP PROTECTION				
	RESTORE LAW		MIL/UN IPTF/CONTRACT	HN/CONTRAC
	SECURITY ASSISTANCE			
	DMZ/PARTITION/BORDER SECURITY		MIL/UN IPTF/HN	HN/CONTRAC
	URBAN SECURITY		MIL/UN IPTF/HN	HN/CONTRAC
	INTERNAL PHYSICAL SECURITY		MIL/HCR	HN/CONTRAC
	WEAPONS CANTONMENT/		MIL/UN IPTF/HN	HN/CONTRAC
	DISARMAMENT		MIL/UN IPTF/HN	HN/CONTRAC
	ESTABLISH JUDICIAL SYSTEM		USAID	
	PENITENTIARY SYSTEM		HCR/UN IPTF	HOST NATION
	POLICE TRAINING		HCR/UN IPTF	HOST NATION
OP LOGISTICS				
	LAW ENFORCEMENT VEHICLES		MIL/UN/NGO	
	LAW ENFORCEMENT EQUIPMENT		MIL/UN/NGO	
ECONOMIC				
	LAW ENFORCEMENT VEHICLES		MIL/UN/NGO	HN/NGO/CONTRACT
	LAW ENFORCEMENT EQUIPMENT		MIL/UN/NGO	HN/NGO/CONTRACT

Legend

	Not a Military Task
	Initially a Military Task
	Shared Task

infrastructure gradually restored, the host nation is retrained to assume basic functions during stabilization.⁶¹ When the country can sustain itself with resources and execute functions with minimal outside assistance, the military presence is minimal and can withdraw.⁶²

"God save thee, ancient Mariner!

From the fiends, that plague thee thus!

-Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Rhyme of the Ancient Mariner

With the emergence of each new conflict, uncharted waters and lurking dragons will await the unwary commander. Dragons, however, are only fairy tales. Refocusing planning emphasis from offensive fire and maneuver, required to achieve victory measured in only hours, as in the Persian Gulf, or days as in Kosovo, is mandatory. Long term operations that influence the source of the conflict during post-hostilities operations are measured in years, are of equal importance to operational functions, and deserve detailed consideration by the staff planner. The only way to dispel fairy tales and dragons is with facts. In any operation, an end-state must be defined. In today's multinational and multi-organizational environment, this end state must be developed in conjunction with those who will ultimately be required to sustain it. Organizing a central point for coordination, empowered with authority equal to the warfighting components, and inclusion of the participants at that level of decision making, will increase unity of effort and maintain continuity across the spectrum of conflict. Training and synchronization of an appropriate force to create a visible, credible military tool that compliments the diplomatic, information, and economic instruments of national power, is the only safe course to sail toward an enduring end state. In today's post-Cold War dynamic, the commander has a responsibility to statecraft that involves weighing the impact of military action against civil considerations throughout the spectrum of conflict; not simple when he ends it.

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